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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

This is a medical indigency case that centers on the interpretation of "necessary medical
services" under the Medical Indigency Act, Idaho Code section 31-3501, et seq. (the "Act").
This case returns to the Court after remand to the Board of Commissioners of Gem County (the
"County" or "Board") in February 2019. See generally Re: Med. Indigency Application of C.H,
164 Idaho 801,435 P.3d 1121 (2019) (remanding for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of
law). On remand, the Board determined that, despite no other care being available to C.H. (the
"Patient"), certain dates of service provided to the Patient were not compensable as "necessary
medical services" under the Act. St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. ("St. Luke's") now appeals the
Gem County District Court's decision affirming the determination of the Board.
B.

1

Course of Proceedings.

St. Luke's, on behalf of the Patient, submitted an application for County aid for necessary
medical services received by the Patient from January 26, 2016, to March 9, 2016. AR at 281300.

2

On September 19, 2016, the County issued an Initial Determination of Approval for

1

It should be noted that another case involving the same issue, but between St. Alphonsus and
Ada County, has also been appealed to the Court. See Supreme Court Docket No. 47867. In that
case, the district court found that the Medical Indigency Act required actual availability of
services to the patient. See Appendix A, attaching Opinion on Judicial Review, Case No. CV0l2019-0972, District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho (Ada Cty. February
3, 2020).
2

The record on appeal in this case requires special citations and explanation. On June 15,
2020, the Clerk of the Court entered an Order Augmenting Appeal that ordered that only a
limited record be filed in this appeal and that the Clerk's Record and Reporters' Transcripts from
the prior appeal, which included the Agency Record and Agency Transcript, be added to the
record in this appeal. However, it appears that the entire Agency Record was refiled in this
appeal as an exhibit to the limited record, was renumbered, and now includes the Board's
decision on remand. Thus, there are multiple records and transcripts involved. The limited
record associated with this appeal (4 7872-2020) will be referred to as the Current Record
("CR"). The record from the previous appeal (45614-2017) will be referred to as the Prior
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 1
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County Assistance as to certain dates of service. AR at 17. The Initial Determination found the
Patient medically indigent, but only approved payment for dates of service January 26, 2016, to
February 2, 2016, rather than the entire period requested. Id. St. Luke's appealed the denial of
the remaining dates. AR at 12.
On February 6, 201 7, the Board held a hearing on its prior determination that services
provided after February 2, 2016, were not medically necessary. See generally ATr, at 1-21.
That same day, the Board issued an Amended Determination of Approval for County Assistance,
extending the approved dates of service through February 18, 2016, but not the remaining dates
through March 9, 2016. AR at 14-16. St. Luke's timely filed a petition for judicial review with
the Gem County District Court. PR at 3-9.
A hearing on the petition for judicial review was held on October 10, 2017, before the
Honorable George A. Southworth. PTr. at 1. On October 18, 2017, the district court entered its
Order on Judicial Review affirming the Board's decision to deny county assistance for dates of
service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016. PR at 76-77. St. Luke's appealed to this
Court. PR at 79-83. This Court held that the Board's findings did not provide a reasoned
analysis as required by the Administrative Procedures Act ("AP A") and remanded the matter
back to the Board to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law. Re: Med.
Indigency Application of C.H, 164 Idaho at 804-05, 435 P.3d at 1124-25.

Record ("PR"). The renumbered Agency Record filed with this appeal will be referred to as the
Agency Record ("AR"), and citations to the same will refer to the renumbered pages. The
transcript from the January 30, 2020, district court hearing underlying this appeal will be referred
to as the Current Transcript ("CTr"). The transcript from the October 10, 2017, district court
hearing underlying the previous appeal will be referred to as the Prior Transcript ("PTr") and the
transcript from the February 6, 2017, hearing before the Board will be referred to as the Agency
Transcript ("A Tr"). There was no hearing before the Board on remand and, thus, no new
Agency Transcript was filed.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 2
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Four months after remand, on June 17, 2019, the Board entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order. AR 478-80. In its decision, the Board ignored the fact that
despite multiple efforts to transfer the Patient, the only facility available to treat the Patient from
February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, was St. Luke's, and again denied dates of services
February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, on the basis that the services provided at St. Luke's
(even though they were the only services available to the Patient) were not the most costeffective services as required under the Act. Id. St. Luke's timely filed a second petition for
judicial review. CR at 13-19. A hearing was held on the second petition on January 30, 2020,
before the Honorable D. Duff McKee. CTr. at 1. On February 14, 2020, the district court issued
its Memorandum Decision affirming the Board. CR at 195-207. On March 11, 2020, St. Luke's
timely appealed to this Court.
C.

Statement of Facts.

The facts of this case are undisputed.

PTr., p. 25, 11. 24-25 ("As the parties have

acknowledged, there's really no dispute of facts."). On January 26, 2016, the Patient was found
unconscious in her home and was transported by ambulance to Valor Health. AR at 22. That
same day she was transported to St. Luke's Meridian Medical Center where she was treated for
meningitis and severe brain lesions. Id. The Patient remained at St. Luke's until March 9, 2016,
when she was transferred to a different facility on the condition that St. Luke's pay for the care.
AR at 317-28. There is no dispute that the Patient is an indigent resident of the State of Idaho or
that Gem County is the obligated county under Idaho Code section 31-3506. AR at 479. Indeed,
the County approved payment for dates of service January 26, 2016, through February 18, 2016.
AR at 480.
As early as February 5, 2016, St. Luke's began assessing the propriety of a lower level of
care at a long-term acute care hospital ("LTACH"), but noted that because the Patient was selfAPPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 3
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pay "placement maybe [sic] difficult."

AR at 320-21.

On February 16, 2016, St. Luke's

contacted Meridian Care about accepting the Patient for transfer, but Meridian Care would not
consider a transfer because the Patient lacked a guaranteed payer source. See AR at 319 (noting
that Meridian Care would not take the Patient because she had a pending "county app."). The
following day, St. Luke's contacted two additional facilities about a transfer. Id. Both declined
to accept the Patient, again because she had no payer source. Id. On February 22, 2016,
St. Luke's contacted two more inpatient facilities, and on February 25, 2016, each facility
declined to accept the Patient due to concerns about her clinical status. See AR at 318.
Two additional facilities evaluated the Patient beginning on February 25, 2016, until,
finally, on March 9, 2016, the Patient discharged to Life Care Treasure Valley ("Life Care").
See AR at 317-18. Of significant note, before Life Care would agree to admit the Patient, a

single patient agreement was negotiated that required St. Luke's to be financially responsible for
the charges incurred at the lower level of care.

See ATr., p. 10, 11. 16-25; AR at 317-28.

Because the Patient was indigent and could not afford the cost of her care, St. Luke's, on behalf
of the Patient, submitted an application for medical indigency benefits that covered her date of
admission on January 26, 2016, until she was transferred to Life Care on March 9, 2016. AR at
281-300. To be clear, St. Luke's is not seeking compensation for the amounts it paid to Life
Care on the Patient's behalf. St. Luke's is only seeking compensation for the period of time
from February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, when the Patient was still physically at, and
receiving treatment from, St. Luke's.

3

3

Notably, although the Patient was still receiving care at St. Luke's, St. Luke's reduced the
charges for care as the intensity of care lessened. That is, St. Luke's did not charge the same
amounts for the time the Patient was in intensive care as for the time the Patient was receiving
a lower level of care. See AR 181-236 (providing daily charges and showing a significant
reduction in charges for February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, when compared to earlier dates).
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Upon receiving the application for medical indigency benefits, the County began its
review to determine the Patient's eligibility for County assistance. As part of that review, the
County engaged a medical doctor, Dr. Doug Dammrose, to conduct a utilization management
review as permitted under Idaho Code sections 31-3503(2) and 31-3503D to opine on the care
given and whether that care was medically necessary from a clinical standpoint. On May 16,
2016, Dr. Dammrose, submitted his review. See AR at 27-30. Dr. Dammrose determined that
the care provided after February 3, 2016, was not medically necessary from a clinical standpoint
because the County had apparently failed to submit medical records for that period of time. See
AR at 25.

4

On October 24, 2016, after the County submitted additional medical records,

Dr. Dammrose amended his review, finding that "the additional clinical notes indicate the patient
was medically stable on 02/12 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care
inpatient hospital."

See AR at 36. On November 16, 2016, after the receipt of additional

physician's notes, Dr. Dammrose again amended his review, finding that the Patient "was
medically stable on 02/19 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care
inpatient hospital." AR at 41.
On February 6, 2017, St. Luke's participated in an appeal hearing regarding the denied
dates of service. At the hearing, St. Luke's did not, and does not, dispute Dr. Dammrose's
4

Dr. Dammrose's May 16, 2016, report states: "The 02/04/2016 to 03/09/2016 inpatient stay
is considered not medically necessary based for purposes of payment since no medical records
are provided for those dates of service other than a note about insertion of a feeding tube on
02/10." AR at 25. However, the record shows that St. Luke's submitted its medical records to
the County on April 6, 2016. AR at 46. Included in those records, among other things, were the
medical notes for dates of service February 3, 2016, to February 13, 2016. AR at 79-84. In
particular, the notes submitted by St. Luke's included the notes from a chest X-ray conducted on
February 13, 2016. AR at 84. Yet, according to Dr. Dammrose's report on November 16, 2016,
those notes, including the notes from the chest X-ray conducted on February 13, 2016, were not
provided to him until October 19, 2016. AR at 40 ("On 10/19 the County provided additional
information ... [which] indicated an improved chest X-ray on 02/13[.]").

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 5
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opinion that the Patient was sufficiently stabilized by February 19, 2016, such that, to the extent
available, treatment at a lower-level facility, rather than a short-term acute care hospital such as
St. Luke's, was appropriate from a clinical standpoint. However, it is also undisputed that no
such lower-level facility was available to the Patient and she was not suitable for discharge to
home.

See AR at 316-28 (setting forth St. Luke's efforts to locate a facility); AR at 100

(discharge note stating "she is unsafe to go home"). Indeed, at the hearing before the Board,
St. Luke's presented evidence of its substantial efforts, beginning in early February, to locate a
more cost-effective medical facility equipped to provide the level of care required for the Patient.
See AR at 316-28; ATr. at 8-11. However, no appropriately equipped lower level of care was

available to the Patient due to her inability to pay, and it was not until St. Luke's was able to
arrange a contract with Life Care, wherein St. Luke's agreed to pay for the care, that a facility
would accept transfer of the Patient. Id.
Importantly, as noted, there is no dispute that the Patient could not have been simply
discharged home after February 19, 2020, given her medical condition. See CR at 179 ("There is
no dispute here that medical services at some level were necessary after February 19, 2016 ....
She could not humanely be turned out to the street."); AR at 316 (noting that it "was not
medically appropriate to [ ] discharge[ ] her home"); AR at 100 (discharge note stating "she is
unsafe to go home"); PTr., p. 26, 11. 22-25 ("Both parties agree that [the Patient] ... could not
have been simply discharged to home[.]"). In short, there is no question that the Patient still
required care, and thus the ability to provide the Patient with care at a lower-level facility
depended entirely upon an equipped facility being willing and available to accept and admit the
Patient.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 6
40914.0131.13040916.4

Dr. Dammrose is a physician, and his professional opinion focused solely on whether a
lower level of care was appropriate from a clinical standpoint. No part of his reports suggest that
care at such a lower-level facility was actually available to this Patient. See AR at 27--43.
Notably, the County itself, despite its clear authorization to do so under the applicable statutes,

5

failed to take any steps to transfer the Patient from St. Luke's to another facility or attempt to
contract with another facility on behalf of the Patient. In fact, the County did not claim, nor
present any evidence suggesting, that there was more cost-effective care from a facility actually
available to treat the Patient. See ATr., p. 14, 1. 12 -p. 15, 1. 4; p. 20, 11. 1-17; see also generally
ATr. at 3-21. Put differently, the County did not contend St. Luke's efforts to place the Patient at
a different facility were not sufficiently diligent or otherwise inappropriate. Id. To the contrary,
at the close of the hearing in front of the Board, counsel for the County acknowledged that
St. Luke's had done what it should have done. Id., p. 20, 11. 5-6 ("I don't think anybody in this
room is saying, hey, they [St. Luke's] didn't ... do what they should have done."). There was
also no contention by the County that the Patient had failed to avail herself of available treatment
at a lower cost facility. See ATr., p. 14, 1. 12 - p. 15, 1. 4; p. 20, 11. 1-17; see also generally ATr.
at 3-21. Nonetheless, without noting or even discussing the actual availability of a facility
willing to provide ongoing care, the Board upheld the denial of treatment from February 19,
2016, to March 9, 2016. See ATr.at 20-21.
After the hearing, the Board issued its Amended Determination of Approval for County
Assistance ("Original Final Order") and, again, without any reference to the fact that there was
5

Under Idaho Code section 31-3503(2) the Board has the following "powers and duties":
"[T]he right to contract with providers, transfer patients, negotiate provider agreements,
conduct utilization management or any portion thereof, pay for authorized expenses directly, or
indirectly through the use of alternative programs, that would assist in managing costs of
providing health care for indigent persons[.]" (emphasis added).
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no lower-level facility available to the Patient, did not approve dates of service from
February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016.

AR at 14-16.

However, as held by this Court, the

Original Final Order did not include any findings of fact or conclusions of law with a reasoned
analysis, and this Court remanded the matter to the Board for entry of the same. On remand to
the Board, there was no additional hearing. But on June 17, 2019, four months after the matter
was remanded to the Board, the Board issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law
("Second Final Order"). AR at 475-77.
In its Second Final Order, the Board again denied dates of service February 19, 2016,
through March 9, 2016. AR at 4 77. In doing so, rather than provide the reasoned statement
required by the AP A and ordered by this Court, the Board adopted not only the medical opinion
of its retained expert Dr. Dammrose, but his legal opinion as well, and only provided the
following two paragraphs regarding the dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9,
2016:

Conclusion: The patient was medically ready for discharge as of
02/19/2016. The medical opinion of Dr. Dammrose is that dates of
service 02/19/2016 to 03/09/2016 were not necessary medical
services as defined in the statute. There was no contrary evidence
presented and St. Luke's argument does not contradict the medical
evidence.
Finding: The Board of County Commissioners determined that
dates of service 0 1/26/2016 to 02/18/2016 were necessary medical
services. The Board of County Commissioners determined that
dates of service 2/19/2016 to 03/09/2016 were not necessary
medical services.
AR at 476.
On review of the Second Final Order to the district court, St. Luke's again argued that
more cost-effective care must actually be available to a patient before that care can be used as a

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 8
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comparison when deciding what treatment is the most cost-effective and therefore medically
necessary under the Act. See generally CR at 43-84, 124--48. St. Luke's also argued that the
Board's decision was not based on the evidence in the record, was an abuse of the Board's
discretion, and still failed to comply with the AP A. Id. The County did not present any evidence
or allege that there was actually any lower-level facility available to this Patient, but argued that
the Board was bound to accept not only Dr. Dammrose's medical opinion but his legal
interpretation of the statute and, therefore, the Board had no choice but to deny the dates of
service in question. CR at 116-1 7.
The district court, like the Board, placed little to no relevance on the fact that no other
care than what St. Luke's provided was actually available to the Patient from February 19, 2016,
to March 9, 2016. Indeed, the district court stated that the only question was whether "such
facilities actually exist, have beds or openings available, and do provide the appropriate level of
care." CR at 186. Whether the facility was actually available to the Patient, i.e., whether the
Patient could afford the facility, whether the facility would accept transfer of the Patient, or
whether the facility was even geographically available to the Patient (e.g., whether the facility
was out of state) was ignored by the district court, and the district court affirmed the Board. CR
at 186-87. St. Luke's now appeals the decision of the Board and the district court.
II.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the Board violated statutory provisions and exceeded its statutory

authority in denying dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, where care at a
lower-cost facility was unavailable to the Patient.
2.

Whether the Board's decision to deny dates of service February 19, 2016, through

March 9, 2016, was unsupported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion.
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 9
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3.

Whether the Board's Second Final Order complies with the APA and this Court's

remand.
4.

Whether St. Luke's rights have been prejudiced.

5.

Whether St. Luke's is entitled to costs and attorneys' fees.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"While a county board of commissioners is not a state agency, express statutory
provisions require a county's denial of medical indigency benefits to be reviewed under Idaho's
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." Re: Med. Indigency Application of C.H, 164 Idaho 801,
803-04, 435 P.3d 1121, 1123-24 (2019). Under the APA, an appellant is entitled to relief if the
county's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions were (1) in violation of statutory or
constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners; (3) made
upon unlawful procedure; (4) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(5) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr. v. Elmore
Cnty., 158 Idaho 648, 650, 350 P.3d 1025, 1027 (2015) (quoting I.C. § 67-5279(3) ). "When the
district court acts in an appellate capacity under Idaho's Administrative Procedure Act, this
Court reviews the agency's determination independent of the district court's decision." Re: Med.
Indigency Application of C.H, 164 Idaho at 804,435 P.3d at 1124.
Appellate courts freely review the interpretation of a statute and its application to the
facts. See St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755,
203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). As to questions of fact, judicial review of an administrative order is
limited to the record, and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency. Application ofAckerman, 127 Idaho 495, 903 P.2d 84 (1995).
A reviewing court may only reverse the decision of the lower tribunal if the appellant's
substantial rights have been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4). Finally, "[i]fthe agency action is not
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affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as
necessary." LC. § 67-5279(3).

IV.

ARGUMENT

This case centers on a question of statutory interpretation. As noted, there is no question
that the Patient was indigent, and the underlying facts are undisputed. The question is simply
whether the services provided to the Patient by St. Luke's, as the only services actually available
to the Patient from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, were "the most cost-effective service or
sequence of services" and therefore "necessary medical services," as defined under the Act. LC.
§ 31-3502(18)A(5). Given the plain language of the Act, the expressly stated policy behind the
Act, other statutory sections within the Act, and existing precedent, only medical services
actually available to the Patient, rather than those that are only theoretically available, should be
compared by the Board when determining whether services "are the most cost effective service
or sequence of services," as defined under the Act. Accordingly, the denied dates of service,
from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, as the only services available to the Patient, were, by
definition, the most cost-effective and therefore compensable necessary medical services under
the Act. Because those services were compensable under the Act, it further follows that the
Board exceeded its statutory authority by denying the Patient assistance for those services dates
and, by doing so, acted without a basis in the evidence in the record and in an arbitrary and
capnc1ous manner.

A.

The Board Acted in Violation of Statutory Provisions and Exceeded Its
Statutory Authority When It Denied the Dates of Service February 19, 2016,
to March 9, 2016, as Being Not Medically Necessary.

Idaho Code section 31-3502(18)A(e) is clear and unambiguous. By its plain language,
the statute requires medical services to be actually available to the Patient when considering
whether they "are the most cost-effective" and therefore a "necessary medical service." Further,
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even if it was ambiguous, the cannons of statutory interpretation dictate an interpretation that
requires medical services to be actually available to the Patient when determining whether they
"are the most cost-effective" services.

The Board's determination to deny assistance to the

Patient on the basis that the only services available to the Patient were not "necessary medical
services" exceeded the Board's statutory authority because its decision violated the plain
language of the statute.
1.

The plain language of Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) establishes that
the denied dates of service were compensable necessary medical
services, and the Board acted in violation of statutory provisions and
exceeded its statutory authority by denying compensation for those
dates.

Statutory interpretation begins with '"the literal words of the statute, and this language
should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning."' Seward v. Pac. Hide & Fur Depot,
138 Idaho 509, 511, 65 P.3d 531, 533 (2003) (quoting Jen-Rath Co. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho
330, 335, 48 P.3d 659, 664 (2002)). If the statutory language is unambiguous, the "'the clearly
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court
to consider rules of statutory construction."' St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd., 146 Idaho at 755,
203 P.3d at 685 (quoting Payette River Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Valley Cnty.,
132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999)); accord State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 476,
163 P.3d 1183, 1188 (2007) ("If the language of the statute is reasonably susceptible of only one
interpretation, the statute is unambiguous and there is no occasion to look beyond the text of the
statute.").
A statute is ambiguous when:
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. However,
ambiguity is not established merely because different possible
interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case then
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all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered
ambiguous. . . . [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because an
astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it.

Jayo Dev., Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 152, 345 P.3d 207, 211 (2015)
(quoting Farmers Nat'! Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 622, 625
(2014)).
Here, the statutes at issue are clear. Idaho Code section 31-3503 provides: "Powers and

duties of county commissioners. The county commissioners . . . shall ... pay for necessary
medical services of the medically indigent[.]"

LC. § 31-3503(1) (second emphasis added).

"Necessary medical services" is defined in Idaho Code section 31-3502(18). In its entirety,
section 31-3502(18) reads:
(18) A. "Necessary medical services" means health care services
and supplies that:
(a) Health care providers, exercising prudent clinical judgment,
would provide to a person for the purpose of preventing,
evaluating, diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, disease or its
symptoms;
(b) Are in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical
practice;
(c) Are clinically appropriate, in terms of type, frequency, extent,
site and duration and are considered effective for the covered
person's illness, injury or disease;
(d) Are not provided primarily for the convenience of the person,
physician or other health care provider; and
(e) Are the most cost-effective service or sequence of services or
supplies, and at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or
diagnostic results for the person's illness, injury or disease.
B. Necessary medical services shall not include the following:
(a) Bone marrow transplants;
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(b) Organ transplants;
(c) Elective, cosmetic and/or experimental procedures;
(d) Services related to, or provided by, residential, skilled nursing,
assisted living and/or shelter care facilities;
(e) Normal, uncomplicated pregnancies, excluding caesarean
section, and childbirth well-baby care;
(f) Medicare copayments and deductibles;
(g) Services provided by, or available to, an applicant from state,
federal and local health programs;
(h) Medicaid copayments and deductibles; and
(i) Drugs, devices or procedures primarily utilized for weight
reduction and complications directly related to such drugs, devices
or procedures.
The present dispute centers around the interpretation of subsection 18A(e), i.e., whether
the services rendered by St. Luke's from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, were the most
cost-effective services available to the Patient at the time of treatment. See CR at 179 ("[T]here
is no argument that the services provided by St. Luke's met all the requirements of this statute,
with the exception of subpart (e)[.]"). Indeed, the only issues addressed at the hearing before the
Board and argument raised by the parties thereto was whether care at a lower cost facility was
clinically appropriate for this Patient, whether there was a facility available and willing to accept
transfer of and admit the Patient, and whether a facility's actual availability to the Patient
mattered under the statute. See generally ATr. at 3-21. The County's position is that the actual
availability of a facility to the Patient-that is, the facility being willing and able to provide a
lower level of care-was immaterial under the Act and that because Dr. Dammrose's clinical
opinion was that a lower level of care was appropriate, the care provided by St. Luke's during
the dates at issue was not medically necessary regardless of whether lower level care was
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actually available. Id.; p. 20, 11. 1-14. The Board, however, failed to address the availability of
care in its Final Order. AR at 14-17.
Similarly, in its Second Final Order the Board, again (even after being directed to enter a
reasoned analysis for denying care by this Court) failed to address the impact of the
unavailability of a lower-cost facility willing to accept the Patient. AR at 4 77.

Instead of

conducting a legal analysis of whether the statutory definition of necessary medical services took
into account the actual availability of the clinically appropriate services to the Patient, the Board
simply adopted, wholesale, the legal opinion of Dr. Dammrose that the services from
February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, were not necessary medical services "as defined in the
statute." Id. The district court did not countenance the County's contention that it was required
to follow Dr. Dammrose's statutory interpretation.

However, the district court placed little

relevance on the fact that facilities that provide the subacute rehabilitative care recommended by
Dr. Dammrose were not actually available to this particular Patient for purposes of comparing
"cost-effectiveness." Instead, the district court held that the only inquiry was whether such
facilities exist and have beds or openings available. Actual availability to the particular patient,
e.g., whether the facility will accept transfer of the patient, or whether the facility is
geographically accessible to the patient is, according to the district court, immaterial. CR at 186.
But the failure to consider whether the facility or care is actually available to this particular
Patient (rather than available in the abstract) contradicts the plain language of section 313502(18)A(e).
Rather, the plain language of Idaho Code section 31-3502(1 S)A(e) requires that only
those services actually available to the Patient are to be considered when determining whether
the services rendered "[a]re the most cost-effective." (Emphasis added.) In pertinent part,
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subsection 18A(e) requires that necessary medical services: "Are the most cost-effective service
or sequence of services .... " LC. § 31-3502(18)A(e) (emphasis added). Thus, in order to be a
"necessary medical service," the services being provided "are" to be the most cost-effective. The
use of the affirmative verb "are" clearly indicates that the services rendered to the patient must
be actual, rather than hypothetical or theoretical, services. There is no suggestion from this verb
choice that the services to be considered are those that are merely potential, such as would
arguably be the case if the statute employed the words "would be."

Rather, by using the

affirmative present tense verb "are," the statute plainly contemplates a connection in time, the
present time of treatment, not some hypothetical, future, or past time. It contemplates services
that are actually and presently available to treat the patient and produce the equivalent
"therapeutic or diagnostic results for the person's illness, injury or disease." Id. By its plain
language, the statute requires that the necessary medical services "[a]re the most cost-effective
service" available, not that the medical services "[would be] the most cost-effective service" or
"[would have been] the most cost-effective service" if only such service was available to the

Patient. Id. In short, that a service was available at some point in the past or may be available at
some point in the future (for example when a patient receives funding) is not suggested by the
text of the statute. The use of the present tense verb "are" in the statute requires present current
availability of the service to the Patient.
Further, the use of the word "most" in the phrase "most cost-effective service"
necessarily invites a comparison of services. Comparing services that are unavailable to the
patient is an illusory endeavor. A service that is unavailable to the patient cannot be the most
cost-effective service because it is not effective at all. That is, a service that is inaccessible to the
Patient (regardless of the reason) has no effectiveness on treating the Patient, let alone the most
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or equivalent effectiveness. Simply put, if a service is unavailable to a patient, it is impossible

for that service to be the most cost-effective.
Here, it is undisputed that although the Patient no longer required all the services of a
short-term acute hospital, such as St. Luke's, the Patient could not be discharged to home and
still required further treatment at an inpatient medical facility. CR at 179 ("There is no dispute
here that medical services at some level were necessary after February 19, 2016 .... She could
not humanely be turned out to the street."); AR at 40 (Dr. Dammrose's report noting that as of
March 9, 2016, the Patient was still "unsafe to go home"). It is also undisputed that there were
no more cost-effective facilities that were able and willing to provide treatment to the Patient
until March 9, 2016.

6

PTr., p. 34, 11. 15-25; ATr. at 9-11. Thus, while other facilities "[would

be or would have been] more cost-effective," those facilities were not available to the Patient.

In contrast, St. Luke's services were the only services available to the Patient, and therefore by
definition they "[a]re the most cost-effective service."
St. Luke's

were

"necessary

section 31-3502(18)A(e).

medical

services"

As such, the services provided by
as

defined

under

Idaho

Code

See St. Joseph Reg 'l Med. Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cnty. Comm 'rs, 134

Idaho 486, 490, 5 P.3d 466, 470 (2000) (holding that Idaho Code Section 18-3502(18)B(g)
requires resources to be "actually available" to a patient before they can be considered as
resources under the Act); see also Appendix A, Opinion on Judicial Review at 8-13 (plain
language requires present actual availability of the services).
Accordingly, because the dates of service from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016,
were, by the plain language of Idaho Code section 31-3502(18), necessary medical services, the
6

This is true despite significant efforts by St. Luke's to transfer the Patient. See supra at 3-4;
AR at 316-22. A facility was only willing to take the Patient on condition that St. Luke's agreed
to be financially responsible for the charges. See ATr., p. 10, 11. 16-25; AR at 323-28.
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Board was required to approve them for payment.

LC. § 31-3503(1) ("The county

commissioners ... shall ... pay for necessary medical services of the medically indigent[.]"
(emphasis added)); Twin Falls Cnty. v. Idaho Comm 'non Redistricting, 152 Idaho 346,349,271
P.3d 1202, 1205 (2012) ("The words 'must' and 'shall' are mandatory[.]"). By denying payment
for the dates of service at issue, the Board violated the provisions of the Act and thereby
exceeded its statutory authority.
2.

Even if Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) is ambiguous, the canons of
statutory construction dictate an interpretation that would require
medical services to be actually available when determining whether
care is a necessary medical service.

For the reasons stated above, St. Luke's believes the statute at issue is unambiguous. But
even if it was ambiguous, further examination only strengthens St. Luke's position. "If it is
necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, the Court will attempt to ascertain legislative
intent, and in construing a statute, may examine the language used, the reasonableness of the
proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd. v.
Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). "[A] statute is
viewed as a whole and not in parts or sections, and is animated by its general purpose and intent.
Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or
section so as to produce a harmonious whole." City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 163
Idaho 579, 584, 416 P. 3d 951, 956 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006) (noting
that the Court will look to "the whole act and every word therein"). Applying these principles to
Idaho Code section 31-3502(18) leads to the conclusion that in order for a service to be
considered the "most cost-effective service," that service must be actually available to the
Patient.
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a.

Considering the Act as a whole.

When considering section 31-3502(18) and the Act as a whole, it is apparent that
subsection (18)A(e) contemplates that when determining which services "[a]re the most costeffective," only those that are actually available to the patient are to be considered. In reading
section 31-3502(18)A, it is notable that subparagraph (a) uses the words "would provide" to
evaluate whether the choice of care accords with what other hypothetical health care providers
would choose in that particular situation, i.e., the care must be in accordance with the standard of
care. In contrast, the remaining subparagraphs in section 31-3502(18)A all use the present verb
"are." This clearly indicates an intent by the legislature to differentiate between the requirement
that the care must be what a hypothetical care provider "would provide" to a patient given the
circumstances, and the requirement that the services to be provided are actually presently
available to the patient: "(b) [a] re in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical
practice"; "(c) [a]re clinically appropriate ... ; "(d) [a]re not provided primarily for [ ]
convenience ... ; and "(e) [a]re the most cost-effective." LC.§ 31-3502A(a)-(e). See State v.
Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004) (noting that if the legislature intended

provisions to have the same meaning, it "would have used the same words").
Additionally, when one considers other parts of the Act, it becomes even more clear that
actual availability to the Patient is required because the Act focuses on actual availability. Idaho
Code sections 31-3503(2), 31-3503A(2), and 31-3507 recognize the interest a county and the
board of the catastrophic health care cost program ("CAT Board") have in the availability and
willingness of actual facilities to treat indigent county residents.

Sections 31-3503(2) and

31-3503A(2) authorize counties and the CAT Board to contract with medical facilities to provide
indigent patients with actual care.
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Section 31-3507 actually empowers a county or the CAT Board to transfer a patient to a
different facility within certain parameters that include the availability of care at the transferee
facility. That is, section 31-3507 explicitly requires that before the county or CAT Board can
require the transfer of a medically indigent patient, the requirements of the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd ("EMTLA"), must be met and the
"necessary medical service must be available" at the receiving facility. LC. § 31-3507 (emphasis
added). The EMTLA provisions provide: "[ a]n appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a
transfer ... in which the receiving facility (i) has available space and qualified personnel for the
treatment of the individual, and (ii) has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to
provide appropriate medical treatment." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2). Thus, both federal and state
law do not allow for a transfer of a patient unless the receiving facility has space, is properly
equipped, "and agrees to accept transfer." Id. (emphasis added). Ignoring actual availability
to the Patient when determining whether a service is the most cost-effective ignores the other
provisions of the Act that require actual availability of a facility before a transfer can occur and
ignores the legal reality in which hospitals and providers operate.
Finally, as will be addressed in more depth below, it is notable that in interpreting a
subsection of the same statute at issue here, this Court stated, "only those resources actually
available to an applicant can be considered for purposes of eligibility for medical indigency
benefits." St. Joseph Reg'/ Med. Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cnty. Comm 'rs, 134 Idaho 486, 490, 5 P.3d
466, 470 (2000) (emphasis added) (interpreting Idaho Code section 31-3502(18)B(g)). When
statutes deal with the same subject, they "are construed, as far as reasonably possible, to be in
harmony with one another." City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 579, 583,
416 P.3d 951, 955 (2018) (quoting Regan v. Owen, No. 43848, 2017 WL 3927024, at *7 (Idaho
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Sept. 8, 2017)). Thus, because this Court has already interpreted subsection (18)B(g) to require
actual availability to the Patient, subsection (l 8)A(e) should be construed in harmony with
subsection (18)B(g) and also require actual availability to the Patient. To hold otherwise would,
as set forth in more detail, infra, frustrate the overall purpose of the Act.
In sum, when viewing section 31-3502(18) and the Act as a whole, and when considering
this Court's interpretation of other subsections within section 31-3502(18), it becomes clear that
section 31-3502(18)A(e) contemplates that only those services that are actually available to the
Patient should be considered when determining whether services "[a]re the most cost-effective
service or sequence of services[.]"

b.

Considering legislative intent.

Such an interpretation is also consistent with the intent and purpose of the Act. "[T]he
legislature's intent in enacting the medical indigency assistance statutes was two-fold:

to

provide indigents with access to medical care and to allow hospitals to obtain compensation for
services rendered to indigents." Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808,810, 153 P.3d
1154, 1156 (2007) (quoting Carpenter v. Twin Falls Cnty., 107 Idaho 575, 582, 691 P.2d 1190,
1197 (1984)). The County's interpretation of the requirements of section 31-3502(18) directly
conflicts with that purpose.
Utilizing hypothetical services, rather than actually available services, to determine that
care is not compensable undermines the intent of the Act. That is, doing so would result in a
provider being faced with the choice of either: (1) discharging a patient home before they are
clinically approved for discharge, or (2) continuing to treat the indigent patient without any
compensation. In either scenario, one of the purposes of the Act is frustrated. Either the indigent
patient is denied access to medical care by being discharged to home before they are clinically
safe to do so; or the provider is deprived of its right to compensation for medical services
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rendered to an indigent patient (and in fact incurs additional expenses). The legislature did not
intend such results.
Furthermore, the first choice outlined above is not a choice St. Luke's or other providers
could (or would) legally or ethically make as it could violate the law, or worse, jeopardize the
life of the patient. This leaves the second, and only real choice, as the only viable option. But
this results in the provider being denied compensation and incurring additional expense, a
scenario expressly against the fundamental policy behind the statute. See I.C. § 31-3501 (stating
that part of the intent of the Act is to "provide for the payment" of medical services rendered to
the medically indigent).

Indeed, if the decision is affirmed, St. Luke's will be denied

compensation for nearly three weeks of medical services it rendered to an indigent resident of
Gem County despite the fact that there is no dispute that the Patient still needed care and there
were no other options for care available. ATr., p. 10, 11. 16-25; AR at 323-28.
That saddling medical providers with contracting to pay for a patient's transfer was not
the legislature's intent is further borne out by the fact that the legislature recognized the issue of
ensuring cost efficiency and saw fit to grant counties and the Cat Board the right to "contract
with providers, transfer patients, [and] negotiate provider agreements." I.C. §§ 31-3503(2); 313503A(2). In other words, the county and the Cat Board have the statutory authority to contract
with providers to ensure that circumstances such as those which have occurred in this case are
minimized or eliminated.

If the county or the CAT Board are not required to reimburse a

medical facility for providing indigent care when treatment at an alternate level of care is
unavailable to a patient, then what incentive is there for the county or the CAT Board to contract
with medical providers or facilitate transfer to another medical facility as they are empowered to
do under the Act? For example, here, if the Board's decision is upheld, it would reward the
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County for ignoring its authority and duty under section 31-3503(2) to contract with and
facilitate a transfer to a rehabilitation facility because the County would not have to reimburse
St. Luke's for the care rendered to its indigent resident for dates February 19, 2016, to March 9,
2016, and it would not have to pay a rehabilitation hospital (that it should have directly
contracted with under section 31-3503(2)) for those dates either.
Ultimately, the County's interpretation of the statute, which places the burden of
transferring indigent patients and negotiating contracts with other providers on the medical
provider, see CR at 115 ("It is the responsibility of the hospital ... to seek out arrangements for
such care."), renders Idaho Code sections 31-3503(2) and 3 l-3503A(2) superfluous, as there
would be no reason to grant the counties and the Cat Board with the authority to "contract with
providers, transfer patients, [and] negotiate provider agreements," if it were the hospital's
obligation to do so. Further, the County's interpretation renders sections 31-3502(2) and 313502A(2) meaningless as there is no incentive for counties or the CAT Board to utilize those
sections and, thus, the powers and duties granted therein will not be utilized and might as well
not be included in the Act. As such, the County's interpretation should be rejected. See, e.g.,
Hodge for & on behalf of Welch v. Waggoner, 164 Idaho 89, 93, 425 P.3d 1232, 1236 (2018)

(interpretations of a statute should not render parts of the statute "superfluous" or "void").
In short, the purpose of the Act is to ensure that indigent patients receive the necessary
medical care they need and to ensure that providers receive payment for medical care provided to
indigent residents. The legislature has provided counties with ample authority to ensure that
treatment

1s

provided

m

a

cost-effective

manner.

Interpreting

Idaho

Code

section 31-3502(18)A(e) to allow the County to deny payment based on hypothetical, rather than
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currently and actually available, services would render Idaho Code sections 31-3503(2) and
31-3503A(2) meaningless and is inconsistent with the Act's purpose.
c.

Reasonableness of proposed constructions.

Although absurdity has no bearing on a statute's plain language, Verska v. St. Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011), when engaging in

statutory interpretation this Court has held that absurd results are disfavored. Stonebrook Constr.
LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 932, 277 P.3d 374, 379 (2012) ("Statutory

constructions that would lead to absurd ... results are disfavored.").
Here, if Idaho Code section 31-3502(18) was interpreted to allow hypothetical or
theoretical services, rather than services actually available to a patient, to be considered in
determining whether services rendered "[a]re the most cost-effective" it would lead to absurd
and unreasonable results. The facts of this case present the scenario where a lower cost facility
was unavailable because facilities were not willing to accept the Patient based upon the lack of
funding. However, there could be other reasons a lower cost facility would not be available to a
patient that would yield equally absurd results. For example, if the statute were interpreted as the
County suggests, even facilities that are not in operation in Idaho would have to be considered in
the medical necessity analysis. As an illustration, long-term acute care hospitals were not in
operation in Idaho until fairly recently.

7

Moreover, there are numerous other specialty type

treatment facilities available nationally or internationally that are still not available in Idaho.
Yet, under the County's interpretation of the statute, these out-of-state specialty hospitals,
7

Southwest Idaho Advanced Care Hospital and Complex Care Hospital of Idaho were not
formed as entities until November 2006 and November 2007, respectively. See Idaho Secretary
of State website, Viewing Business Entity, Southwest Idaho Advanced Care Hospital, Inc.,
available at https://www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/C169997.html; id. Complex Care
Hospital ofIdaho, available at https://www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/Dl 17065.html.
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although clearly geographically unavailable to the Patient, would have to be considered in
determining whether the services they offered were the "most cost-effective service" that could
possibly be rendered to the Patient.
Another basis upon which treatment may not be available at a lower cost facility could be
bed availability. That is, a county medical advisor could say a patient is clinically appropriate
for a lower level of care, but no appropriate facility has capacity to accept the patient. Indeed,
this Court directly addressed the issue of bed availability in St. Joseph Regional Medical Center
v. Nez Perce County Commissioners, 134 Idaho 486, 5 P.3d 466 (2000). In that case, the county

denied payment to a provider because care was, in theory, available at a state psychiatric facility.
Id. at 489-90, 5 P.3d at 469-70. However, the facts of the case revealed that there were no beds

actually available at the state psychiatric facility. Id. at 490, 5 P.3d at 470. This Court held that
because there were no actual beds available for the patient, the state psychiatric facility could not
be considered a resource under Idaho Code section 31-3502(18). Id. But, under the County's
interpretation, bed availability would not matter-the only question is whether the facility exists,
somewhere.
Perhaps a more timely scenario is illustrative. As we are all aware, COVID-19 has put
medical facilities under significant strain to provide services and at the same time attempt to
limit the risk of contamination. Suppose that a patient is clinically appropriate for a lower level
of care, but none of the facilities will accept the patient because they are worried about possible
COVID-19 contamination between facilities. The hospital might inquire of, beg, offer to pay for,
and even transport the patient to the doorstep of the other facilities, but if the other facilities will
not accept the patient the effort is futile. Thus, the only care available to the patient is to remain
where they are. But, under the County's interpretation, the care provided would no longer be the

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 25
40914.0131.13040916.4

most cost-effective and therefore not compensable under the Act.

Thus, as with the other

scenarios, the hospital is left with a false choice, discharge the patient or continue to treat the
patient without compensation. As noted above, either choice is inconsistent with the purpose of
the Act and results in absurdity. Ignoring the reality that a lower cost facility is unavailable to
the Patient (regardless of the reason) requires the provider to operate under absurd conditions
that would undermine the expressly stated purpose of the statute.
Ultimately, because when the statute is read as a whole, and because it would frustrate
the intent of the Act and lead to an absurd result otherwise, even if the Court determines that the
statute is ambiguous, Idaho Code section 31-3502(18)A(e) should be interpreted to mean that
only those services that are actually available to the patient should be considered when
determining whether the services rendered "[a]re the most cost-effective."

Such an

interpretation would lead to the same result as discussed above, see supra Part IV .A.1, and by
denying payment for the dates of service at issue, the Board violated the statutory power duty
granted it under the Act and thereby contravened the statutory provisions of the Act and
exceeded its statutory authority.
B.

The Board's Decision Was Unsupported by Substantial Evidence on the
Record and Was Arbitrary, Capricious, and an Abuse of Discretion.
1.

The Board's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence in the
record.

"Evidence is substantial and competent only if a reasonable mind might accept such
evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.

To establish whether an agency's action is

supported by substantial and competent evidence, this Court must determine whether the
agency's findings of fact are reasonable." Cooper v. Bd. of Prof'! Discipline of Idaho State Bd.
of Med., 134 Idaho 449, 456, 4 P.3d 561, 568 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

Accordingly, "[a] finding of fact without any basis in the record [is] clearly
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erroneous." Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 62, 831 P.2d 527, 530 (1992) (citations omitted).
"Also, a finding of fact lacking substantial and competent evidence to support it is clearly
erroneous." Id. In order to uphold the Board's decision under the clearly erroneous standard, the
Court must conclude that the record contains "some reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
in support of its position." Idaho Cnty. Nursing Home v. Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho
933, 940, 821 P.2d 988, 995 (1991).
In St. Joseph, supra, the county denied an application because it found that the patient
could have received care at lower cost facilities such as a state psychiatric facility or alcohol

treatment through Port of Hope and Roger's Counseling Center rather than at an acute
psychiatric hospital where the treatment took place. 134 Idaho 486, 5 P.3d 466 (2000). Relying
upon the affidavit testimony of a state mental health program manager to that effect, the county
applied the clinical assessment to the definition of "necessary medical services" and determined
that because the services the patient had received at the acute psychiatric hospital were "available
to" the patient "from state, federal and local health programs," the services rendered at the
hospital were not "necessary medical services" and therefore denied payment. Id. at 489-90, 5
P.3d at 469-70.
However, the factual record in St. Joseph revealed that a voluntary bed at the state
psychiatric hospital was not actually available to the patient and that as soon as follow-up
treatment could be arranged through Roger's Counseling Center, a lower-cost facility, the patient
was transferred. Id. at 490, 5 P.3d at 470. The Court outlined the efforts by the hospital therein
to transfer the patient and the unavailability of a facility to take the patient until the transfer
ultimately took place. Id. Based upon these facts, on appeal to the district court, the district
court "dismantled the Board's finding that other resources were available to [the patient]" and
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determined that "none of the documentation upon which the Board based its decision provided
any details as to whether specific services were actually available to [the patient]."

Id.

(emphasis added). On appeal to this Court, this Court noted that the district court's reasoning
was "in accord with authority prescribing that only those resources actually available to an
applicant can be considered for purposes of eligibility for medical indigency benefits," and
reversed the Board. Id. (emphasis added). The Court then went on to state that because the only
evidence in the record was that the facilities identified by the county as "available" to take the
patient were not actually available to take the patient, the evidence did not support the county's
denial. Id.
The same is true here. The Board denied the dates of service from February 19, 2016,
through March 9, 2016, because Dr. Dammrose, like the mental health program manager in
St. Joseph, submitted a report that indicated the Patient did not need the services of an acute care
hospital and could have received care at a lower-level facility. AR at 41. However, like in
St. Joseph, it is clear that although St. Luke's pursued those alternative care options at other
facilities, none of the other facilities were actually available to the Patient during the time period
at issue. AR at 317-22. Then, again like in St. Joseph, as soon as a lower level of care became
available (and only because St. Luke's agreed to pay the Patient's bill) the Patient was
transferred. Id. And again, like in St. Joseph, there is no evidence in the record that care at a
lower-level facility was available to the Patient at any time before March 9, 2016. Indeed, the
County does not even allege-let alone are they able to provide evidence that-the actual
availability of a facility willing to provide a lower level of care and in fact admits that St. Luke's
did what it should have. See generally ATr. at 3-21 (County does not dispute that there were no
other available facilities or suggest that there was a facility other than St. Luke's that was
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actually available to the Patient); ATr., p. 20, 11. 4-6 (stating that St. Luke's did not do anything
wrong).
Like in St. Joseph, the Board's decision to deny service for the dates at issue was not
supported by the evidence in the record.

As a result, the Board's decision was arbitrary,

capricious, and an abuse of discretion. See St. Joseph, 134 Idaho at 490, 5 P .3d at 4 70 (holding
that because the patient was refused admission to provider the board's finding that other
resources were available was contrary to the evidence). This case should accord with the holding
in St. Joseph.

8

The Court should reverse the County's denial of dates of service February 19,

2016, through March 9, 2016, because the only evidence in the record is that the allegedly more
cost-efficient care identified by Dr. Dammrose and the County was not actually available to the
Patient. As noted above, care that is not actually available to the patient has no effectiveness
and, therefore, by definition cannot be the "most cost-effective."
2.

The Board abused its discretion when it wholly adopted
Dr. Dammrose's legal conclusion and interpretation of the statute.

Idaho Code section 3 l-3505C(l) states that "the county commissioners shall make an
initial determination to approve or deny an application .... " (emphasis added). Section 313505B states that the "county commissioners shall approve an application for financial
8

In its decision, the district court attempts to distinguish St. Joseph 's from the present case by
stating that St. Joseph 's did not reach the question of whether "financial considerations are to
be taken into consideration." CR at 205. But this position ignores the fact that in St. Joseph's
the Court explicitly acknowledges that the patient "was homeless, without income and with
access to only one week of resources," and that the only facilities considered were the state
hospital and those run by charitable organizations. St. Joseph Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho at
490, 5 P.3d at 470. Indeed, one of the reasons the patient was not accepted at the state hospital
appears to have been because "Pathgrant Funds had[ d] been exhausted." Id. In short, while
perhaps not explicitly stated, the issue of "financial considerations" is implied in the Court's
decision-presumably, if the patient had the means, and was not reliant on "Pathgrant Finds"
that had been exhausted, there would have been numerous private facilities that would have
accepted transfer of the patient.
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assistance if it determines that necessary medical services have been or will be provided .... "
(emphasis added). Thus, the determination of whether to approve or deny an application and
whether necessary medical services have been provided to a patient rests solely on the county
comm1ss10ners.
Here, however, the Board abdicated its role under the Act in favor of adopting
Dr. Dammrose' s medical opinion regarding whether the services rendered met the legal
definition of necessary medical services under the Act. In relevant part, in its Second Final
Order, the Board concluded as follows: "The medical opinion of Dr. Dammrose is that dates of
service 02/19/2016 to 03/09/2016 were not necessary medical services as defined in the

statute." AR at 477 (emphasis added). This is the only support that is provided for the Board's
finding that the dates of service from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, were not necessary
medical services. There is no review of the statute and there is no determination of whether
services have to be actually available to the Patient before they can be considered under the legal
definition of necessary medical services. Rather, Dr. Dammrose gave a medical opinion that the
Patient no longer required the services of an acute inpatient hospital like St. Luke's and was
clinically appropriate for a rehabilitation facility.

The Board apparently concluded, with no

discussion of the statute or the fact that there was no lower cost facility willing to accept the
Patient, that Dr. Dammrose's medical opinion was sufficient to meet the legal definition of
necessary medical services under the Act. This was an abuse of discretion as the Board failed to
act within the bounds of its discretion or consistently with the legal standards regarding its duty
articulated under the Act that require the Board, not Dr. Dammrose, to determine whether
necessary medical services have been provided. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,
863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) (holding that an abuse of discretion occurs when the decision
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maker fails to act within the bounds of its discretion or consistently with the applicable legal
standards). Indeed, the Board failed to apply any legal standards at all and relied solely on the
medical standards articulated by Dr. Dammrose.
Dr. Dammrose offered his clinical opinion about the services at issue based on medical
facts. To the extent he offered a legal opinion about the Act, such a statement is entitled to no
greater weight than any other witness, attorney or commissioner. Specifically, Dr. Dammrose
determined that "the patient was medically stable on 02/19 and it appears she no longer needed
the services of an acute care hospital" and that "[h]er medical care was at maintenance level, and
her needs were rehabilitative in nature." AR at 41. St. Luke's does not dispute those clinical
op1mons.

The County appears to take Dr. Dammrose' s statements as also a legal opinion

applying and interpreting Idaho law. In this regard, if read that way, St. Luke's takes issue with
the legal conclusion that follows, wherein Dr. Dammrose steps beyond his qualifications as a
medical reviewer and interprets and applies Idaho law.

He cites the statutory definition of

"necessary medical services" related to whether the services rendered were the most costeffective and concludes that the treatment at issue "is considered not medically necessary for
purposes of payment." Id. The meaning behind his "for purposes of payment" reference is
unclear.
Dr. Dammrose' s conclusion that the services rendered were not necessary medical
services, while potentially true from a clinical standpoint, finds no support from a legal
standpoint or in the factual record the Board was charged with reviewing. When, as was the case
here, there is no available alternative service, the service provided is de facto the most costeffective service.

Furthermore, Dr. Dammrose is not qualified as a legal expert.

He notes

throughout his report that various facilities declined to admit the Patient. See AR at 40. But
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Dr. Dammrose is apparently unfamiliar with St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. Nez Perce
County Commissioners, which, as noted above, held that "only those resources actually available

to an applicant can be considered for purposes of eligibility for medical indigency benefits." 134
Idaho 486, 490, 5 P .3d 466, 4 70 (2000).
In sum, Dr. Dammrose is not the finder of fact, nor is he imbued with the authority to
interpret or apply the law.

The Board is.

The Board abused its discretion and erred by

abdicating to Dr. Dammrose its duty to draw the necessary factual and legal conclusions relating
to whether the services at issue were, from a legal standpoint, "necessary medical services." As
such, the Board's decision should be reversed.

C.

The Board's Second Final Order Fails to Comply with the APA.

This Court remanded this matter to the Board so that it could formulate findings of fact
and conclusions of law that addressed the issue at hand, i.e., whether services must be actually
available to the Patient before they can be the "most cost-effective" for purposes of determining
medically necessity as defined under the statute. See Re: Med. Indigency Application of C.H,
164 Idaho 801, 804, 435 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2019) (remanding to the Board and stating that "[i]t is
vital for the Board to provide specificity in the findings such that there was 'a reasoned statement
in support of the decision."' (quoting LC. § 67-5248)). The Board did not do so. Rather, it
issued a summary statement in which it relied on its medical expert's interpretation of the
statutory definition of necessary medical services and denied assistance.
The AP A requires, in part, that:
(1) An order must be in writing and shall include:
(a) A reasoned statement in support of the decision. Findings of
fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a
concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record
supporting the findings.
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LC. § 67-5248. As articulated by this Court, "specificity in the findings and reasons of the lower
tribunal is vital to appellate review . . . . It is vital for the Board to provide specificity in the
findings such that there was a reasoned statement in support of the decision."

Re: Med.

Indigency Application of C.H, 164 Idaho at 804, 435 P.3d at 1124; see also Dexter v. Idaho
State Bar Bd. of Comm 'rs, 116 Idaho 790, 792, 780 P.2d 112, 114 (1989) ("Commissioners have

a duty to formulate findings of fact and conclusions of law so that a reviewing court may have a
basis to conduct meaningful review.").
Here, the Board's Second Final Order is provided in summary fashion. It simply states:
Conclusion: The patient was medically ready for discharge as of
02/19/2016. The medical opinion of Dr. Dammrose is that dates of
service 02/19/2016 to 03/09/2016 were not necessary medical
services as defined in the statute. There was no contrary evidence
presented and St. Luke's argument does not contradict the medical
evidence.
Finding: The Board of County Commissioners determined that
dates of service O1/26/2016 to 02/18/2016 were necessary medical
services. The Board of County Commissioners determined that
dates of service 2/19/2016 to 03/09/2016 were not necessary
medical services.

AR at 477.
Notably missing is any reasoned statement setting forth why the dates of service from
February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, are not medically necessary. The fundamental legal issue
in this case is if care at a lower cost facility is clinically appropriate, but no lower cost facility
will accept the Patient, then is the care that is provided medically necessary under the statute. In
its second opportunity to provide analysis and reasoning to address this legal issue, all that the
Board provides is a passing reference that Dr. Dammrose's medical opinion was that the dates of
service were not medically necessary pursuant to Dr. Dammrose's interpretation of the statute.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 33
40914.0131.13040916.4

The Board does not provide its interpretation of the statute nor does it state why the services
were not medically necessary as defined by the statute. Further, the Board fails to provide "a
concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts of record supporting the findings" as
required under Idaho Code Section 67-5248(1)(a), as there is no discussion of the underlying
facts of the case, including the undisputed fact that there were no other facilities willing to accept
transfer of the Patient.
In short, there is no language addressing why the Board determined that the services
failed to meet the legal definition of necessary medical services under the statute other than that
Dr. Dammrose said so.

Thus, St. Luke's is left to guess at why the dates of service from

February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, were denied. Such a decision is not entitled to deference
as it fails to meet any of the rationales or the test for the same, see J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State
Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 859-62, 820 P.2d 1206, 1216-19 (1991) (setting out rationale and

test), fails to comply with the APA, and deprives the Patient and St. Luke's of due process. See
Dexter, 116 Idaho at 792, 780 P .2d at 114 ("[F]indings of fact are necessary to fulfill the

requirements of due process oflaw."); Cortez v. Owyhee Cnty., 117 Idaho 1034, 1036, 793 P.2d
707, 709 (1990) (requiring in a medical indigency case "that the county commissioners' final
decision contain findings of fact and conclusions oflaw."). Because the Board failed to provide
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law that provide specificity as to why the dates of
service from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, were denied, the Board's decision failed to
comply with the APA and should be reversed. See, e.g., Mills v. Holliday, 94 Idaho 17, 19, 480
P.2d 611, 613 (1971) ("It is the general rule that an agency order not supported by findings of
fact where such findings are required will be set aside."); Cooper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm 'rs of Ada
Cnty., l O1 Idaho 407, 411, 614 P .2d 94 7, 951 ( 1980) (holding in part that "because the board
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failed to make specific written findings of fact and conclusions upon which its decision was
based, the decision of the board cannot stand.").
Moreover, because the County has continued to fail to provide a reasoned analysis, this
Court should decided the matter rather than remanding, as the County should not be rewarded for
continuing to comply with its duty by giving it additional chances to rationalize its decision.
But, even if the Court determines that remand is necessary, St. Luke's requests that, to provide
guidance to the Board, the Court address the legal issue raised:

whether Idaho Code

section 31-3502(18)A(e) requires that services must be actually and presently available at the
time of treatment before they can be used in comparing whether services provided to a patient
"are the most cost-efficient services[.]" See N Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass 'n v. City of Hayden,
164 Idaho 530, 540, 432 P.3d 976, 986 (2018) ("Where an appellate court reverses or vacates a
judgment upon an issue properly raised, and remands for further proceedings, it may give
guidance for other issues on remand." (quoting Urrutia v. Blaine Cnty., 134 Idaho 353, 359, 2
P.3d 738, 744 (2000))).
D.

St. Luke's Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced.

The Act grants hospital providers the right to compensation for providing necessary
medical care to indigent patients. Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808, 810, 153
P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) ("[T]he legislature's intent in enacting the medical indigency assistance
statutes was two-fold: to provide indigents with access to medical care and to allow hospitals to
obtain compensation for services rendered to indigents." (quoting Carpenter v. Twin Falls Cnty.,
107 Idaho 575,582,691 P.2d 1190, 1197 (1984))); St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd.
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm 'rs of Gooding Cnty., 150 Idaho 484, 488, 248 P.3d 735, 739 (2011)

("[T]he Act was meant to ensure that hospitals obtain actual compensation for the care provided
to indigent patients.").
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Here, there is no question that the Patient was indigent. By denying compensation for
dates of service February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, when the only evidence in the record was
that the Patient could not be discharged home and St. Luke's was the only provider that was
willing to provide the necessary services to the Patient, the Board violated St. Luke's right to
compensation for providing necessary medical services to an indigent patient. By depriving
St. Luke's of its statutory right to compensation, St. Luke's substantial rights have been
prejudiced. See generally, e.g., St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd., supra, (noting in
the standard of review that a substantial right must be prejudiced to overturn the Board's
decision and then proceeding to overturn the Board's decision to deny the provider compensation
because the Board's decision was contrary to the Act).

E.

St. Luke's Is Entitled to Reasonable Attorneys' Fees.

St. Luke's requests attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117(1),
which provides that "the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." I.C. § 12-117(1 ). A party acts
without a reasonable basis in fact or law when it "has no authority to take a particular action."
Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808, 812, 153 P.3d 1154, 1158 (2007) (quoting
Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005)).
As the foregoing clearly demonstrates, the County had no authority nor basis in the
record to support denial of the dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016. Not
only does the application of undisputed facts to the plain language of the statute demonstrate
error, but a well-established medical indigency decision by the Idaho Supreme Court directly
addresses the impropriety of denial based on more cost-effective service options without
corresponding evidence that such options were "actually available" to a patient.

St. Luke's
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presented ample undisputed evidence that the services Dr. Dammrose references were not
actually available until March 9, 2016.

There was no evidence in the record, or even an

allegation by the County, that services at a lower-level facility were actually available to the
Patient. The Board's decision had no basis in law or fact. Accordingly, St. Luke's respectfully
requests an award of costs and attorney's fees.
Additionally, the Board was directly ordered by this Court to provide "specificity" in its
findings and reasons. The Board took more than four months after the remand to issue its
Second Final Order, and the order it eventually issued still lacked specificity and failed to even
address the issue at hand. If the Court finds that the matter needs to be remanded, yet again, to
the Board for additional findings, St. Luke's should be awarded its attorney's fees under Idaho
Code Section 12-11 7( 1) for having to bring this appeal on findings that continue to be deficient.
V.

CONCLUSION

Idaho Code section 31-3502(1 S)A( e) requires that services be actually and presently
available at the time of treatment before they can be considered in determining whether services
provided to a patient "[a]re the most cost-efficient services[.]" The only argument presented by
the County at the hearing before the Board was that the denial of the Patient's treatment for dates
of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, was because the services provided were
not the "most cost-effective services[.]" While St. Luke's does not dispute that care at a lowerlevel facility would have been appropriate from a clinical standpoint, the undisputed evidence
before the Board demonstrated that care at a lower-level facility was not actually available to this
Patient. Because St. Luke's services were the only services actually available to this Patient,
they were, by definition, the most cost-effective. As such, those services met the statutory
definition of necessary medical services and St. Luke's has a right to be compensated for those
services.

The County's denial of the dates of service at issue was a violation of statutory
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provisions and exceeded its statutory authority. Further, it is clear that the Board acted without a
basis in substantial evidence and in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
St. Luke's, therefore, respectfully requests that the Court award its costs and attorneys'
fees and vacate the decision of the district court and order the Board to approve payment for
dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016.
DATED THIS 5th day of August, 2020.
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